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Juvenile Law
Juvenile Law; juvenile court law
Welfare and Institutions Code §707 (repealed); §§707, 707.1, 707.2,
707.3, 707.4 (new); §§637, 661, 727 (amended).
SB 523 (Presley); STATS 1975, Ch 1266
Revises the procedure for transferringa minor to adult criminal

court by requiringjuvenile court to hold a transfer hearing before
jeopardy attaches; sets forth criteria which the juvenile court must
consider, but allows the court to make its determination to transfer

a minor on the basis of any one of the factors enumerated; specifies
the place of detention, sentencing alternatives,cases which may be
returnedto juvenile court, and proceduresfor sealing records; establishes that parents of wards and dependent children of the court
may be required by a juvenile court to participate in counseling;
prescribes the length of time the probation officer has to produce
evidence of a prima facie case against a minor being detained
pending an adjudicationof wardship.

Transfer of Minors to Adult CriminalCourt
Section 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code has been rewritten
by Chapter 1266 to provide that the juvenile court has jurisdiction to
transfer to the adult criminal court a minor 16 years of age or older
at the time he or she allegedly violated a criminal law, if the court finds
the minor not amenable to the care and treatment of the juvenile court.
Formerly, Section 707 permitted the transfer hearing to be held any time
during the jurisdictional hearing in juvenile court to adjudge the minor
a ward of the court. The United States Supreme Court, in Breed v.
Jones [- U.S. -, 95 S.Ct. 1779 (1975)] reviewed this provision of
the California Welfare and Institutions Code and found it to be unconstitutional. The Court held that the prosecution in adult court after the
jurisdictional hearing in juvenile court violated the double jeopardy
clause of the fifth amendment as applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment [id. at 1791]. Furthermore, the Court stated that
jeopardy attaches in a juvenile court proceeding when the juvenile court,
as the trier of fact, begins to hear evidence [1d. at 1787]. Accordingly,
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Section 707 now requires the transfer hearing to be held prior to the
attachment of jeopardy.
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 1266, Section 707 required a juvenile court to cause the probation officer to investigate and submit a report on the behavioral patterns and social history of a minor being considered as unfit for juvenile court treatment. The California Supreme
Court interpreted the former statute to require the juvenile court to consider the minor's behavioral pattern as described in the probation officer's report in determining the minor's fitness for juvenile court treatment [Jimmy H. v. Super. Ct., 3 Cal. 3d 709, 714, 478 P.2d 32, 35,
91 Cal. Rptr. 600, 603 (1970)]. Section 707 continues to require the
court to cause the probation officer to submit a behavioral and social
history report on the minor, and now expressly requires the court to consider the probation officer's report and any other relevant evidence introduced by the probation officer or the minor.
In Donald L. v. Superior Court [7 Cal. 3d 592, 498 P.2d 1098, 102
Cal. Rptr. 850 (1972)] former Section 707 was challenged as being
unconstitutionally vague on the ground that no express standards for
transfer were included in the statute [Id. at 601, 498 P.2d at 1104, 102
Cal. Rptr. at 856]. The court rejected the contention that the statute
was unconstitutionally vague and expressed the view that the proper operation of juvenile law is predicated on treating each minor as an individual, with any attempt to explicate standards with particularity appearing
not merely unnecessary but undesirable as likely to set up mechanical
categories which the spirit of the law forbids. [Id.] Nevertheless, Section
707, as rewritten by Chapter 1266, now requires the court to base its
determination that the minor is unfit for juvenile treatment on an evaluation of the following express criteria: the degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor; the minor's previous delinquent history; the
success of previous attempts to rehabilitate the minor; the circumstances
and gravity of the offense allegedly committed by the minor; and the
probability that the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration
of juvenile court jurisdiction. The criteria set forth in new Section 707
are almost identical to the factors enumerated by the California Supreme
Court as being proper for the judge to consider [Jimmy H. v. Super.
Ct., 3 Cal. 3d 709, 715-16, 478 P.2d 32, 36, 91 Cal. Rptr. 600, 604
(1970)]. Furthermore, the legislature appears to have considered the
warning in Donald L. v. Superior Court [7 Cal. 3d 592, 498 P.2d 1098,
102 Cal. Rptr. 850 (1972)] that particularized standards may create
mechanical categories which the spirit of the law forbids and appears
to have avoided such mechanized treatment by requiring the judge to
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consider all relevant evidence in the individual case before ordering a
minor unfit for juvenile treatment.
Pursuant to former Section 707, the nature of the offense alone was
insufficient to support a transfer order. The current Section 707 provides that the judge, after considering all the relevant evidence, may base
his determination of unfitness on any one criterion or any combination
of the criteria set forth in Section 707. Thus, the circumstances surrounding the commission and the gravity of the offense may now be the
sole basis for a determination that the minor is unfit. Furthermore, Section 707 now requires the court to recite in the transfer order which factor or factors it relied upon in making its determination of unfitness.
This provision is apparently in response to Kent v. United States [383
U.S. 541 (1966)] where the Court held that a juvenile court was required to set forth the basis for a transfer order with sufficient specificity
to permit meaningful review [Id. at 561]. Section 707 also provides
that no plea which may have been entered shall constitute evidence at
the fitness hearing.
The Supreme Court in Breed v. Jones, supra, expressly declared that
its opinion was not meant to foreclose the states from requiring substantial evidence or probable cause as a prerequisite to transfer [- U.S. -,
95 S. Ct. 1779 n.18, 1790 (1975)]. While former Section 707 required
substantial evidence that the minor was 16 years of age or older when
he or she allegedly committed a criminal offense and that the minor was
not amenable to the care and treatment of the juvenile court in order
to justify a transfer to adult criminal court, the present section is silent
as to the weight of evidence necessary on either the issues of amenability
or of whether the minor committed the alleged offense. In People v.
Joe T. [48 Cal. App. 3d 114, 121 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1975)] the court
stated that so long as the issue of amenability is fully and properly considered, a transfer order will not be set aside unless it is not based on
substantial evidence or unless improper criteria are utilized [Id. at 119,
121 Cal. Rptr. at 331-32]. Although the United States Supreme Court
has never attempted to prescribe the nature or quantum of evidence that
must be present to support a decision to transfer a juvenile to adult court
[Breed v. Jones, -

U.S. -,

95 S. Ct. 1779, 1790 (1975)], the view

has been expressed that some evidence that the juvenile committed the
alleged act is probably a constitutional requisite to a transfer order despite statutes which refer merely to an allegation of delinquency [Carr,
The Effect of the Double Jeopardy Clause on Juvenile Proceedings, 6
U. TOL. L. REv. 1, 26 (1974)]. Furthermore, it appears clear that
a preliminary hearing to consider whether probable cause has been esPacific Law Journal Vol. 7
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tablished that the minor committed the offense would not cause jeopardy
to attach [Breed v. Jones, - U.S. -, 95 S. Ct. 1779 n.18, 1790
(1975)]. Thus, apparently unresolved is the issue of whether a statute
may merely require an allegation of delinquency, as the present California statute does, before subjecting a minor to a transfer hearing. Also,
another seemingly unresolved issue is whether the California courts will
vacate transfer orders not based on substantial evidence of unfitness
when the judge has considered all the relevant evidence and has not utilized improper criteria.
Section 707.1 has been added by Chapter 1266 to provide that once
the minor is declared unfit the case shall proceed according to the law
applicable in a criminal case. However, unless the juvenile court specifically orders the individual minor delivered to the custody of the sheriff
upon finding that the safety of the public or of the inmates of juvenile
hall cannot be protected, the minor, if detained, shall remain in the juvenile hall pending final disposition by the criminal court.
Except as provided in Sections 1731.5 (standards for admission to
the Youth Authority) and 1737.1 (authority for the committing authority to commit a minor to state prison or a county jail when such
person is rejected by the Youth Authority), Section 707.2 prohibits
sentencing to state prison a minor under the age of 18 years who has
been declared unfit, except pursuant to Article 5 (commencing with
§1780) of the Welfare and Institutions Code. Article 5 specifies that
when a person's date of discharge occurs before the maximum term precribed by law for the offense, the Youth Authority shall petition the committing court if the Youth Authority believes that unrestrained freedom
for the person would be dangerous to the public (§1780). Such person
may be discharged, placed on probation or committed to state prison by
the committing court (§1782). Section 707.2 further provides that prior
to sentencing the juvenile court may remand persons eligible for commitment to the Youth Authority to its custody for the purpose of evaluation
and report for a period not to exceed 90 days.
Section 707.3 specifies that once jeopardy has attached in the criminal
proceeding, the case shall not be returned to the juvenile court. But
if the alleged circumstances and gravity of the offense were relied upon
to transfer the juvenile and the charge is dismissed or found untrue by
the court of criminal jurisdiction, the minor must be returned to juvenile
court to respond to any lesser charges which remain if the minor consents to being returned. In all other cases-as when the alleged circumstances and gravity of the offense were not relied upon to transfer the
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juvenile to criminal court-the minor may be returned to juvenile court
for trial or disposition of any pending charge, if he or she consents to
being returned.
Section 707.4 specifies that in any case where there is no criminal
conviction and the minor is not returned to juvenile court, all copies of
the minor's record in criminal court must be delivered to the juvenile
court and the minor's name must be obliterated from any index or
minute book maintained in the criminal court. The minor's criminal
record shall be maintained by the juvenile court until such time as the
record is ordered sealed by the juvenile court pursuant to Section 781.
Section 707.4 only applies if the person has no prior conviction in a
criminal court.
Requiring Parentsto Participatein Counseling
Prior to amendment by Chapter 1266, Section 727 required a parent
or guardian of a neglected or physicially abused minor (§600(d)) to
participate in a counseling program as a condition of continued custody
when the court ordered the parent or guardian to retain custody of the
minor subject to the supervision of a probation officer [CAL. STATS.
1971, c. 1729, §4, at 3679]. As amended by Chapter 1266, Section
727 continues to require mandatory counseling for a parent or guardian
of a neglected or physically abused minor when the court orders the parent or guardian to retain custody subject to the supervision of a probation officer; however, Chapter 1266 has removed the provision making
the parent's participation in the counseling program a condition of the
parent's continued custody of the minor. Furthermore, Section 727
now gives the court discretion to order counseling for parents or guardians of other dependent children if such parents or guardians are permitted to retain custody. Finally, the court now has the discretion to order
parents of wards of the court (§§601 (beyond control), §602 (violation
of a criminal law) ) to participate in a counseling program with the minor if the court has ordered that they retain custody of the minor and if
the court finds that they have received notice pursuant to Section 661
that counseling may be required.
DetentionPendingJurisdictionalHearing
Welfare and Institutions Code Section 636 provides that a minor shall
not be detained pending an adjudication of wardship unless such detention is a matter of immediate and urgent necessity for the protection of
the minor or the person or property of another. Additionally, case law
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 7
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requires that there be evidence of a prima facie case or probable cause
to detain a minor alleged to have violated a criminal law [In re William
M., 3 Cal. 3d 16, 28, 473 P.2d 737, 746, 89 Cal. Rptr. 33, 42
(1970)]. However, prior to Chapter 1266-neither statutory nor case
law indicated how much time would be allowed a probation officer to
produce evidence of a prima facie case [CONTINUING EDUCATION OF
THE BAR, CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURT PRACTICE §48 (Supp. 1974)].
Chapter 1266 has amended Section 637 to allow three judicial days for
the production of evidence when the minor or minor's attorney requests
evidence of a prima facie case be produced. When the court determines
that a hearing cannot be held in three judicial days due to the unavailability of a witness, however, the court may grant a continuance not to
exceed five judicial days.
See Generally:

1)
2)
3)

Rudstein, Double Jeopardy in Juvenile Proceedings, 14 WM. & MARY L. REv. 266
(1972).
Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 S-rAN. L. REv. 985 (1975) (critique of state programs interfering
with parental autonomy).
Note, Double Jeopardy and the Waiver of Jurisdiction in California's Juvenile
Courts, 24 STAN. L. REv. 874 (1972).

Juvenile Law; contraceptives for minors
Civil Code §34.5 (amended).
SB 395 (Beilenson); STATS 1975, Ch 820
Support: California Chapter of the National Organization of
Women; County Health Care Administrators Association of California; Zero Population Growth
Prior to its amendment by Chapter 820, Civil Code Section 34.5 provided that unmarried, pregnant minors could receive care related to
pregnancy without parental consent, and that any contract to receive
such care was not subject to disaffimance by the minor. As amended
by Chapter 820, Section 34.5 now allows unmarried minors to receive
care related to the prevention of pregnancy (i.e. contraception), as well
as care related to pregnancy, with the express provision that a minor
shall not be sterilizedwithout parental consent.
COMMENT
Chapter 820 has supplemented previous legislation which expanded
the circumstances under which minors may receive medical care without
parental consent. Married minors (§25.6), minors on active duty with
the armed services (§25.7), and emancipated minors 15 years of age
or older who are living separate and apart from their parents or legal
Selected 1975 California Legislation
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guardian and who are managing their own financial affairs (§34.6)
have the ability to contract for medical services without parental consent.
Section 34.7 allows minors 12 years of age or older to give consent for
treatment of communicable, contagious, or infectious diseases (e.g.,
venereal disease). Finally, Section 10053.2 of the Welfare and Institutions Code has been construed as authorizing family planning services,
including medical treatment, for any minor female, with or without parental consent, provided that such minor is of childbearing age and either was or is eligible for welfare assistance or is a member of a family
that is likely to become a recipient of state or federal financial assistance

within five years [57 Ops. ATT'Y

GEN.

551, 552 (1974)].

The legislative purpose in amending Section 34.5 was apparently to
avoid the anomalous situation of requiring parental consent for minors
to receive contraceptives, but not requiring parental consent to provide
the same minor with an abortion. While one commentator hopes that
such legislation will allow teenagers to prevent unwanted pregnancies,
physicians may be understandably reluctant to prescribe contraceptives
for minors if they are not protected from tort liability and if they are
not assured of payment under the contract [Comment, A Minor's Right
to Contraceptives, 7 U.C.D. L. REv. 270, 282 (1974) (hereinafter referred to as A Minor'sRight to Contraceptives)]. While it would appear
that legislation freeing minors from the necessity of obtaining parental
consent for medical services is designed to relieve the medical profession from tort liability for not obtaining parental consent [1 WITKIN,
SUMM RY OF CALIFORNIA LAW,

Contracts §275 (8th ed. 1973)], it

could be argued that the enactments only relate to contractual capacity
and do not necessarily resolve the question of whether an unauthorized

battery has occurred [57 Ops.

ATT'Y GEN.

551, 555 (1974)]. The

power to give contractual consent and the power to give consent to otherwise tortious acts are not synonymous, nor are they necessarily coexistent in the same person [Comment, Medical Care and the Independent
Minor, 10 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 334, 340 (1970)]. Whether the
phrase "and such consent shall not be subject to disaffirmance because
of minority" refers to consent in the contract or tort sense, or both, is
uncertain. The use of the word disaffirmance is traditionally associated
with contracts, and Section 34.5 is positioned in the Civil Code among
other statutes definitely related to contractual capacity [Id. at 340-41).
A physician might commit a battery merely by prescribing a drug for
a minor without the consent of the minor's parent. Even if the physi-
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cian performed skillfully, such a battery would render him liable for
all harm proximately resulting from the treatment [Comment, Minors
and Contraceptives: The Physician's Right to Assist Unmarried Minors
in California,23 HASTiNGS L.J. 1486, 1499 (1972)]. While one commentator expresses the view that the physician is protected from tort liability for battery so long as the minor's consent is informed [Id. at
1504], another commentator states that the medical profession would
receive financial protection for contraceptive services provided to minors
under a disaffirmance statute, but the physician might still be liable under a tort theory [A Minor's Right to Contraceptives, supra, at 283
n.57].

Juvenile Law; petitions for guardianship
Probate Code §§1440.1, 1440.2, 1440.3 (new); § 1440 (amended).
SB 438 (Petris); STATS 1975, Ch 1181
Support: California Association of Adoption Agencies; Children's
Home Society of California
Opposition: State Bar of California
Section 1440 of the Probate Code provides that proceedings for appointment of a guardian for the person or estate of a minor are initiated
by the filing of a petition for guardianship by a relative, non-relative,
or the minor if he or she is 14 years of age. Chapter 1181 has amended
Section 1440 to require that if the petitioner is not a relative of the
minor, nor named in a will as guardian, and the petition involves the
guardianship of the person of the minor, the State Department of Health
must also be served with the petition. The petition must contain: (1)
an allegation that the petitioner will submit all information necessary to
the agency investigating his or her suitability for guardianship; (2) a
disclosure of any petition for adoption of the minor by the petitioner;
and (3) an allegation as to whether or not the petitioner's home is licensed as a foster home.
Sections 1440.1 and 1440.2 have been added by Chapter 1181 to
provide that if an adoption petition has been filed, the agency investigating the adoption must provide the court considering the guardianship
with a report concerning the suitability of the petitioner for guardianship. If no adoption petition has been filed, the local agency which licenses foster homes must submit the report to the court considering the
guardianship. Copies of such reports must also be furnished to the petitioner. Chapter 1181 has also added Section 1440.3 to the Probate
Code to provide that if the Director of Health is the petitioner, none
of the procedures delineated by this chapter are applicable.
Selected 1975 California Legislation
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The apparent purpose of this legislation is to remedy the situation
which arises when potential adopting parents or foster parents with a
minor temporarily placed in their home fear a negative recommendation
on the adoption petition or removal of the foster child from the home
and therefore apply for guardianship, preventing the removal of the
child. Chapter 1181 will involve either the adoption agency or foster
home investigating agency in procedures for appointment of a guardian
for a minor.
See Generally:

1)

7 WrrmN, SummAy oF CALiFORMA L&w, Wills and Probate §§539-557 (8th ed.
1974) (appointment of a guardian).

Juvenile Law; notice of detention hearing
Welfare and Institutions Code §630 (amended).
SB 338 (Dunlap); STATS 1975, Ch 82
Support: California District Attorneys' Association; California Peace
Officers' Association; California State Sheriffs' Association
If a minor is to be retained in custody pending the jurisdictional hearing which determines whether the minor should be adjudged a ward or
dependent childi of the court, a probation officer must petition the juvenile court for a detention hearing [CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§630,
632]. Prior to the enactment of Chapter 82, Section 630 of the Welfare
and Institutions Code required the probation officer to notify a parent or
guardian of the time and place of the detention hearing if the petition
alleged the minor to be a ward of the court as described in Section 601
(beyond the control of parents) or Section 602 (violation of a criminal
law). As amended by Chapter 82, Section 630 now requires the probation officer to notify each parent or each guardian of the time and place
of the detention hearing if the whereabouts of such parents or guardians
can be ascertained by due diligence. The purpose of this amendment
is to assure that parents, without custody of the minor but liable for the
expenses of detention pursuant to Section 903 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, will have notice of the detention hearing [Senator John
F. Dunlap, Press Release, (May 20, 1975)].
See Generally:

1)

2)

Comment, Parental Responsibility for the Costs of luvenile Detention, 3 CAL.
WEs.L. P~v. 134 (1967).
4 PAc. LJ., REvIEw oF SELE TED 1972 CALIFOm'IA LEISLATiON 541 (1973)
(Welfare and Institutions Code §630, as amended in 1972).

Juvenile Law; assault on school employees
Welfare and Institutions Code §653.5 (new).
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 7
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AB 693 (Montoya); STATS 1975, Ch 931
Support: California Teachers' Association; Los Angeles County District Attorney
Opposition: California Youth Authority; California Probation, Parole and Correctional Association
Chapter 931 has added Section 653.5 to the Welfare and Institutions
Code to require a probation officer to file a petition to have a minor
adjudged a ward or dependent child of the court when such officer has
probable cause to believe that the minor has committed an aggravated
assault or battery upon a public school employee during the course of
such employee's school-related duties. In all other cases the county probation officer has the discretion to file or refuse to file a petition with
juvenile court to have a minor adjudged a ward or dependent child of
the court [CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§650, 652]. This new legistion requiring mandatory filing was drafted at the request of the United
Teachers of Los Angeles because they felt stronger measures were necessary to prevent violence in the schools [Interview, Ray Kniss, Legislative Advocate, California Teachers' Association, August 28, 1975].
COMMENT
Chapter 931 appears to represent a departure from current juvenile
statutory and case law. Section 626 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code gives a police officer the discretion to release a minor taken into
custody under provisions of Section 625 without taking any further action. Section 630 gives the probation officer discretion as to whether
to file a petition with the juvenile court to retain custody of a minor
who has been brought before such officer after having been taken into
temporary custody pursuant to Sections 625 or 625.1. Section 652
gives the probation officer the discretion whether to commence juvenile
court proceedings against a minor who such officer has cause to believe is a person within Sections 600, 601 or 602, even where such person has not been taken into custody. Additionally, Section 654 gives
the probation officer the discretion to undertake a program of supervision for a minor who the officer concludes is or probably soon will
be within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court in lieu of filing a petition. Section 502 states that the purpose of juvenile court law is to provide such care and guidance as will best serve the welfare of the child,
and that wherever possible the minor should not be removed from the
custody of his or her parents unless the welfare of the child or the public
cannot be safeguarded without such removal.
Selected 1975 California Legislation
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The California Supreme Court in In re William M. [3 Cal. 3d 16,
473 P.2d 737, 89 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1970)] held that the juvenile court
could not establish a rule that all juveniles accused of a specific type
of offense should automatically be detained. The court stated that the
nature of the charged offense cannot of itself constitute the basis for
detention [Id. at 30, 473 P.2d at 747, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 43]. The court
based its holding upon Section 635 of the Welfare and Institutions Code
which provides that the court at a detention hearing must order the release of a minor unless the minor has violated a prior order of the court,
is likely to flee the jurisdiction of the court, or it appears that it is a
matter of urgent necessity for the protection of such minor or of the
person or property of another that such minor be detained.
It would thus appear that juvenile statutory and case law generally
provides for discretionaryhandling of juveniles, with detention to be determined on an individual basis considering the circumstances of each
case. Therefore, Chapter 931, which provides for mandatory filing of
a petition to have a minor declared a dependent child or ward of the
court whenever a probation officer has probable cause to believe that
a minor has committed an aggravated assault or battery upon a public
school employee during the course of such employee's school-related
duties appears to be a departure from the orientation of the Juvenile
Court Law in this respect. Additionally, since the holding in In re William M. specifies that the juvenile court, in its hearing on the petition
for detention, cannot order such detention solely upon the nature of the
offense charged, the mandatory filing of a petition in circumstances
which would not justify detention might be a meaningless process.
Finally, it is possible that Chapter 931, in singling out minors vho
assault school employees for a mandatory detention hearing, may be violative of equal protection, since minors who are alleged to have committed aggravated assault or battery upon other persons would still be
within the discretionary provisions of the juvenile court law. It is at
least arguable that there is no more compelling state interest in protecting school employees than in protecting other members of the public,
and that, therefore, such discriminatory classification as results from the
enactment of Chapter 931 is violative of equal protection.
Juvenile Law; school-related problems
Education Code §10751 (amended); Welfare and Institutions Code
§§601, 601.1 (amended).
SB 524 (Rodda); STATS 1975, Ch 1183
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 7
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(Effective September 30, 1975)

Section 10751 of the Education Code prohibits access to a minor's
school records without judicial process, although certain persons are excepted from the judicial process requirement. Chapter 1183 has
amended Section 10751 to include within those excepted from the judicial process requirement a designated member of a school attendance
review board seeking access to the records of pupils referred to the
board. The information acquired by the board is to be kept in strict
confidence and used only for purposes of the board.
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 1183, Section 601.1(b) of the
Welfare and Institutions Code provided that a minor could be adjudged
a ward of the court for school-related insubordination, habitual truancy,
or failure to respond to the directives of a school attendance review
board. Chapter 1183 has eliminated this subdivision from Section
601.1 and has added a similar provision to Section 601 (§601(b)).
However, Section 601 (b) does not retain insubordination as a basis of
juvenile court jurisdiction. Instead, Section 601 (b) now provides as a
basis for juvenile court jurisdiction the persistent or habitual refusal to
obey the reasonable and proper orders of school authorities. Finally,
Section 601 (b) provides that a minor adjudged a ward solely pursuant
to the provisions of Subdivision (b) shall not be removed from the custody of a parent or guardian except during school hours.
Chapter 1183 has also incorporated the changes in Section 601 of
the Welfare and Institutions Code which were made by Chapter 192 of
the Statutes of 1975. Chapter 192 amended Section 601 to remove
from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court those minors "in danger of
leading an idle, dissolute, lewd or immoral life." Therefore, Section
601 (a) now grants juvenile courts jurisdiction over only those persons
under the age of 18 years who persistently or habitually refuse to obey
the reasonable and proper directions or orders of their parents, guardians, or custodians, or who are beyond the control of such persons. The
net effect of Chapters 192 and 1183 therefore is to now grant juvenile
courts jurisdiction over those minors who come within Section 601 (a),
above, and over those minors who, having been referred to a school
attendance review board as being beyond the control of school authorities or as being habitual truants (§601.1), fail to respond to the directives of the review board or to the services provided by such board, or
for whom the board determines that the available public or private services would be insufficient or inappropriate (§601 (b)).
Selected 1975 California Legislation
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COMMENT
While the provision of Section 601(a) which has been repealed by
this chapter has been held constitutional by the California appellate
courts [See, e.g., In re Daniel R., 274 Cal. App. 2d 749, 79 Cal. Rptr.
247 (1969); People v.Deibert, 117 Cal. App. 2d 410, 256 P.2d 355
(1953)], it was declared unconstitutional by a three-judge federal court
and by a court in Alameda County [See Gonzales v. Mailliard No.
50424 (N.D. Cal., Feb.9,1971); Valery v. Municipal Ct. No. 434560
(Alameda County Super. Ct., May 7, 1973)]. The federal decision
was vacated and remanded by the United States Supreme Court for reconsideration of the remedy, but the Court apparently agreed that the
language was unconstitutionally vague [Mailliard v. Gonzales, 416 U.S.
918 (1974)]. Hence, Chapter 192 would seem to have been enacted
in response to this decision. The remaining provisions of Section
601 (a) which permit a minor who persistently or habitually refuses to
obey the reasonable and proper orders of his or her parents, guardian,
or custodian, or who is beyond the control of such persons, to be adjudged a ward of the court, are, however, also of questionable constitutional validity. The court in Gonzales v. Mailliard [No. 50424 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 9, 1971)] observed that the "reasonable and proper" language of Section 601 (a) might be void for vagueness, and that the "beyond contror' provision may be an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty because it does not specify a persistent lack of control [Id., reprinted at 1 PEPPERDiNE L. REv. 12, 19, n.13 (1973)]. Additionally,
a statute subjecting minors to juvenile court jurisdiction and institutionalization for being habitually disobedient of the reasonable and lawful
commands of their parents was held unconstitutional in In re E.M.B.
[No. J 1365-73, (D.C. Super. Ct.), 42 U.S.L.W. 2032 (July 17,
(1973)]. The rationale of the In re E.M.B. court was that a child who
has committed no crime should not be subject to institutionalization for
an occasional breach of vague standards of behavior under a statute
which fails to give fair warning of proscribed behavior. This reasoning
could be applied to Section 601, since pursuant to Section 730, a Section 601 minor may be committed to a juvenile home, ranch, or camp.
The constitutionality of the entire Section 601 was challenged in In
re Henry G. [28 Cal. App. 3d 276, 104 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1972)], and
while the appellate court reversed the lower court on grounds of insufficient evidence to find the minor beyond the control of his parents, the
appellate decision observed that Section 601 could become a means of
systematically discriminating against certain juveniles and thereby deny
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 7
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them equal protection of the law [Id., at 282, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 587].
In a similar vein the Gonzales court was concerned with the possible
abuse of Section 601 because authorities could use it when they did not
have sufficient evidence to charge a minor with a crime under Section
602 [Gonzales v. Mailliard No. 50424 (N.D. Calif., Feb. 9, 1971), reprinted at 1 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 12, 19 (1973)]. (Under Section
602 minors may be adjudged wards of the court for violating a criminal
law or for violating a court order after having been found to be a Section
601 minor).
Both the Gonzales and In re E.M.B. courts denied any implication
that the legislature was powerless to bring non-delinquent children
within juvenile court jurisdiction [Id. at 19-20; 42 U.S.L.W. at 203233]. However, such a statute must be precisely and narrowly drawn,
setting forth with particularity the circumstances under which a child's
past behavior over a significant period of time is so potentially harmful
to the child that a temporary deprivation of liberty, where no other alternative is available, is necessary to protect the child. Further, the statute cannot permit a child to be institutionalized for unruly behavior that
disrupts family peace but presents no threat of actual harm to the child
[42 U.S.L.W. at 2032-33].
In 1970, the California Assembly Interim Committee on Criminal
Procedure recommended the repeal of Section 601, and as an alternative, suggested that most minors who fall within Section 601 could come
under the jurisdiction of juvenile court pursuant to Section 600(a). Section 600(a) gives the court jurisdiction to declare a minor a dependent
child of the court if the minor is in need of proper and effective parental
control. The alternative suggested by the Interim Committee avoids the
possibility of subjecting a minor who has committed no crime to the
strong coercive controls available for wards of the court [TIE CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,

JUVENILE COURT PROCESSES 33-34 (1970)]. Thus, there seems to be
no practical need for Subdivision (a) of Section 601, and there is a
strong possibility that Subdivision (a) is unconstitutional.
See Generally:
1)

2)
3)
4)
5)
6)

CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR,

CALIFORNIA JUVENIL

COURT PRACTICE §24

(Supp. 1974)."

1970 CONFERENCE RESOLUTION 2-3 (proposed change
to §432).
Gonion, Section 601 of California Welfare and 'Institutions Code: A Need for
Change, 9 SAN DIco L. Rsv. 294 (1972).
Roybal, Void for Vagueness: State Statutes Proscribing Conduct Only for a Juvenile, 1 PEPPER.DINE L. REv. 1 (1973).
STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA,

Comment, Juvenile Law: A Potential CaliforniaChange, 2 PAC. LJ. 737 (1971).
Comment, Parens Patriaeand Statutory Vagueness, 82 YALE L.J. 745 (1973).
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